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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size and composition on the IPO and post-
IPO performances of investee companies in an attempt to shed some light on the extent to which larger and 
more diverse syndicates are more likely to suffer from internal agency problems which might hinder the 
decision making process and lead to less value added for their portfolio companies.  The question is of great 
relevance because, while the vast majority of the empirical literature compares VC backed IPOs with non VC 
backed ones, most VC funding is provided by syndicates of two or more financiers.   
We construct alternative measures of size as well as diversity based on several VC characteristics such as age, 
geographic location, type and affiliation of VC firms and find that larger and more diverse syndicates are 
associated with higher underpricing and lower valuation at the IPO date. Furthermore we provide evidence 
that that diversity and size are  negatively correlated to the long term performance of the IPO firms and  this 
finding is robust to several alternative measures of long term performance. 
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“Too many people on the board, misalignment of interests,…, whenever you’ve got at least four VCs 
sitting around a table, you run the risk of a decision vacuum …” 
 – Brad Feld – Managing Director of Foundry Group. 
1. Introduction 
The ability of venture capitalists to create value for their portfolio companies has been an 
extensively investigated topic in finance. Part of this literature has addressed this question by studying 
how venture capital (VC hereafter) financing impacts on the performances of their portfolio companies at 
and after their  IPO date.  The vast majority of this literature compares VC-backed IPOs with non-VC-
backed ones providing mixed evidence as to the role of VC financing. In doing so, these empirical studies 
treat VC financing as uniform. However, VC firms can differ along several dimensions including 
affiliations, age, reputation and more. Yet, very little research has been done to date to explore in greater 
depth whether, and if so to what extent, the size and composition of VC syndicates plays a role in 
determining the short and long run IPO performance of their portfolio companies.  
This paper aims to fill this gap by looking at a sample of VC-backed US IPOs in the period between 
1985 and 2012. We find that the VC syndicate size and diversity have a significantly negative impact on 
both short and long term IPO performance, after controlling for other relevant factors that can affect them.  
The question is of great relevance because in fact the majority of VC backed IPOs are financed by two or 
more VCs. In our sample for instance roughly 70% of the total number of IPOs is backed by a VC 
syndicate, in line with what documented in other papers (Tian, 2012). 
 
Various arguments have been put forward to explain the preference of VCs to syndicate a deal 
rather than going solo.  Some of the benefits from syndication include the ability to achieve a better risk 
diversification (Lockett and Wright, 1999, 2001), the opportunity to take advantage of  a second opinion 
particularly in cases of high uncertainty (Lerner, 1994; Casamatta and Hartichabalet, 2007; Cestone, 
Lerner, and White, 2006), the value added due to complementary skills and expertise (Brander, Amit and 
Antweiller, 2002), and finally the opportunity to build a network that can ensure a better deal flow in the 
future  (Lockett and Wright, 2001). 
 
On the other hand,  more recent papers also highlight that VC syndicates, like all alliances 
involving the sharing of formal control, are likely to suffer from internal agency problems and higher 
coordination costs which can potentially undermine their effectiveness and their ability to add value to 
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their portfolio companies (Wright and Lockett, 2003; Chemmanur and Tian, 2011). Additionally, as size 
grows VC syndicates are also more likely to involve different types of investors with divergent objectives 
thereby becoming more diverse and heterogeneous and hence further exacerbating the risk of internal 
agency conflicts (Du, 2011; Chahine et al., 2012)  
  
This paper explores in greater depth the relationship between VC syndicate financing and the IPO 
performance of their portfolio companies.  It is well known that VCs bring value to their investees through 
their expertise, business guidance and close monitoring. We conjecture that larger and more diverse VC 
syndicates might fail to achieve this as they are more likely to face internal agency and coordination 
problems which can result in weaker oversight and monitoring of their ventures and in a reduced ability 
to align the interests of the syndicate members. If this is the case, we would then expect these agency 
problems  to have a negative effect on their portfolio firm’s performance and, specifically, lead to poorer 
IPO performance.  
 
We analyse both short and long term IPO performance where the short term performance is 
measured by the first day return (underpricing) as well as by the company’s market valuation 
(Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Tian, 2011). Similarly, we use several indicators to capture long 
term performance including industry adjusted EBITDA,  cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and Tobin 
Q over one to three years after the IPO.   
 
Our variables of interest are the size of the VC syndicate and its diversity.  We propose several 
alternative measures of size in order to better capture the dynamics of VC syndicate over the life of a 
project as size often change from round to round. Similarly, we construct a two diversity measures based 
on four different diversity indicators such as VC age, VC type, VC affiliation, VC country of origin. The 
first measure is a simple composite index similar to the one proposed by Chahine et al. (2012) while the 
second is obtained from a principal component analysis. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
employing such a broad set of measures of size and diversity. 
 
Our findings document that larger and more diverse VC syndicates are associated with 
significantly higher underpricing and lower IPO valuation.  We also find that this negative impact is long 
lasting as VC size and diversity also translate in significantly poorer long term performance.  
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Only a few papers have analysed the effect of VC syndicates .  Tian (2012) for instance compares 
the value creation of VC syndicates as opposed to that of a single VC.  The author looks at several 
dimensions to assess the value creation which include the exit mode, the degree of innovation, and also 
short and long run IPO performances for a sample of IPOs between 1980 and 2005. The author documents 
that VC syndicates outperform single VC.   He does not however explore in depth the impact of syndicate 
size or composition. Chehine et al. (2012) instead investigate the impact of VC syndicate diversity on 
earnings management for a sample of 274 UK and US VC backed IPOs and find that more diversity is 
associated with significantly more earnings management. They also document that diversity is  positively 
correlated to IPO underpricing. Their paper differs from this one because in that we look at a much larger 
sample of US IPOs over a longer period of time and also construct many alternative proxies for size and 
diversity whereas they focus on a single diversity index constructed based only on affiliation, age and 
nationality of VC.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample.  The methodology 
and our hypothesis are detailed in Section 3 while the results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 is about 
the robustness checks and the last section concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 This paper contributes to two main strand of the literature on VC financing: the literature on the 
costs and benefits of VC syndicates, and more generally of financial syndicates, and the literature on the 
performances of VC backed IPOs. In this section, we present a brief overview of both. 
 2.1. Costs and benefits of VC syndication 
There is an extensive literature that attempts to explain why venture capitalist usually syndicate their 
deals. Several different hypothesis have been proposed to identify the benefits of syndication.  
For instance, the diversification hypothesis  postulates  that syndication allows VC firms to reduce 
their risk exposure by diversifying their portfolio thereby allowing them to make larger investments that 
would otherwise be difficult  (Lockett and Wright (1999, 2001)).  Various papers support the second 
opinion hypothesis which  argues that syndication allows VC firms to get a credible second expert opinion 
regarding the value of the investment project which is of particular value when the project is perceived as  
highly uncertain  (Lerner (1994), Casamatta and Hartichabalet (2007), Cestone, Lerner, and White 
(2006)).  An alternative explanation suggest that VC firms can conceal their underperformance and hence 
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maintain a high likelihood of future fund raising by collaborating with reputable and successful VC peers, 
which is known as the window dressing hypothesis (Lockett and Wright (2001), Bygrave (1987), Sorenson 
and Stuart (2002)).   Finally, the value adding hypothesis conjectures instead that syndication allows VC 
firms to exploit their complementary skills and specific expertise thereby adding more value to their 
portfolio companies.  
More recently, Tian (2012) explores the link between VC syndication and innovation and finds that 
VC syndicate promotes innovation, measured by number of patents granted and total number of citations, 
more than individual VC and this is reflected in better IPO and post-IPO performances.  
 
There are however also costs associated with syndication. For instance Bruton et al. (2010) argue 
that  different demands from limited partners and different incentives of each syndicate member can lead 
to principal-principal conflicts of interests within the syndicate which can ultimately result in inefficient 
monitoring of the portfolio companies. (Hochberg,  Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007)).  
In a recent paper, Chemmanur and Tian (2011) develop a model to explain the dynamics of VC 
syndicate formation. Their model formalizes the idea that VCs need to provide effort in order to add value 
to the entrepreneur’s project and in the context of co-financing, they may be encouraged to free-ride on 
one another thereby causing an under-effort provision. In this framework, they are able to predict which 
types of venture should opt for a single VC rather than a syndicate and how, in the latter case, the 
composition of the VC syndicate evolves over time.  
Similarly, in the banking literature Carletti et al. (2007) theoretically examine the effect of free-
riding problems in the context of multiple banking relationships. They argue that as the number of banks 
increases, the benefits from more risk diversification need to be traded off against more severe free riding 
problems resulting in sub-optimal monitoring efforts. 
 
Our paper does not enter in the merit of why VC syndicates are formed, but, conditionally on the 
project being syndicated, rather focuses on whether the size and the degree of diversity of the syndicate 
affects the IPO and post-IPO performances of portfolio companies.  As size and diversity grow, it is likely 
that the benefits from syndication can be counterbalanced by the increasing inefficiencies.  For instance, 
participating VCs might have very different objectives and this can cause misalignment of interests.  
It is for instance well documented that corporate VCs have very different strategic objectives than 
independent VCs (Hellmann, 2002; Arping and Falconieri, 2010).  Chahine et al. (2012) examine the 
relation between the degree of diversity within a VC syndicate and earnings management in a sample of 
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274 VC-backed IPOs in UK and US. They construct an index of VC syndicate diversity that encompasses 
several dimensions such as VC affiliation, age, and origin. Their findings show that VC syndicate diversity 
increases the likelihood of earnings management and the impact is stronger for US IPOs. The authors 
interpret their results suggesting that more diverse syndicates suffer from more severe principal-principal 
problems that exacerbates internal conflicts of interests and ultimately lead to poor monitoring of the 
investee companies. They also document that earning management leads to a poorer IPO performance.  
Du (2011) also examines the effect of heterogeneity on the performance of VC syndicates. She 
argues that the costs of heterogeneity in terms of miscommunication, misaligned objectives and often 
inefficient decision making need to be traded off against the benefits in terms of learning opportunities in 
the long run.  Consistent with her conjecture, she provides evidence that more heterogeneous syndicates 
tend to have lower exit rates but longer survival rates. 
 
2.2. VC funding and IPO performances     
2.2.1 Short run IPO performances  
An extensive empirical literature compares the IPO performance of VC-backed firms with non VC-
backed ones. In the short term, IPO performances is typically measured by the level of underpricing, that 
is the price spike of a firm’s stock at the opening of the trading on the secondary market. The existing 
evidence is however mixed.  
Using a matched sample of 320 VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs between 1983 and 1987, 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) document that VC-backed IPOs exhibit lower underpricing than non-VC-
backed IPOs. They explain this evidence by arguing that VC financing provides certification to outside 
investors about the quality of the listing company, and thus mitigates the adverse selection problem. They 
also show that VC-backed IPOs typically have more experienced underwriters and lower underwriting 
fees. Barry et al. (1990) specifically examine the relation between IPO underpricing and the quality of 
monitoring provided by venture capitalists. For a sample of 433 VC-backed US IPOs completed during 
the period 1978-1987, the authors document that VC firms hold quite large equity positions, and take 
approximately one-third of the IPO’s board seats. They interpret this evidence as suggesting that VCs 
closely monitor their portfolio companies and hence are able to certify the quality of the offering. They 
conjecture that IPO underpricing should decrease with the quality of monitoring and propose six different 
proxies of the VCs’ quality of monitoring to test this conjecture, one of these being the number of venture 
capitalists. Their findings suggest that the number of VCs carries the expected negative sign but with a 
weak statistical and economic significance.  
7 
 
On the other hand, Gompers (1995) develops a theoretical model that demonstrates that new venture 
capital firms have an incentive to take their portfolio companies public earlier than what would be optimal 
in order to increase their reputation and hence their future fund flow, the so called “grandstanding 
hypothesis”.  Lee and Wahal (2004) test the prediction of Gompers’ model on a sample of 6,413 IPOs 
between 1980 and 2000 of which 37% consists of VC-backed IPOs. After controlling for the endogeneity 
of the VC financing decision, they find that VC-backed IPOs are underpriced more than non VC-backed 
IPOs and the difference ranges from 2% in the period 1980-1998 to 25% during the internet bubble (1998-
2000). They interpret this result by arguing that a successful IPO enables VC to raise more funds in the 
future and confirm their conjecture by documenting a positive relationship between IPO underpricing and 
future fund-raising.  Finally, Bradley and Jordan (2002) show that the first day return of VC-backed 
IPOs is not significantly different from that of non VC-backed IPO after controlling  for industry, listing 
exchange and underwriter quality.  
At present, few papers have investigated whether the size and the diversity of the VC syndicate plays 
a role in explaining the first day return. Tian (2011) for instance compares the value creation of VC 
syndicates as opposed to that of a single VC.  The author looks at several dimensions to assess the value 
creation which include the exit mode, the degree of innovation, and also short and long run IPO 
performances for a sample of IPOs between 1980 and 2005. In this paper, in contrast, we specifically 
focus on the effect of the size as well as the composition of VC syndicates on IPO performances.  
  
  2.2.2. Long Run IPO performance 
 Evidence shows that VC firms tend to maintain significant equity holdings as well as seats in the 
board long after the IPO is completed.  
Using  a sample of US IPOs between 1983 and 1987, Megginson and Weiss (1991) document that VC 
ownership reduces from 36.6% of the firm before the IPO date to 26.3% after the offer date. The authors 
argue that this works as a commitment device or “bonding mechanism”.  Barry et al. (1990) reveal that, 
in their sample of 433 US VC-backed IPOs between 1978 and 1987, 58% of the VCs do not sell any of 
their shares and those who do sell, liquidate on average 6.6% of their equity stake. They also confirm that 
VCs maintain a significant representation in the firm’s board.  
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) and Krishnan et al. (2011) find similar results on more recent samples. 
The latter links VC reputation, measured by the IPO market shares in the three years prior to the IPO, to 
larger shareholding and more board representation in the three years after the IPO and find that this results 
in better long term performances of their IPO companies for a sample of US IPOs between 1993 and 2004. 
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This evidence has spurred a lot of empirical research aiming  at assessing how the VC presence in the 
post-IPO period impacts on the companies’ long-run performance.  
 Jain and Kini (1995) compare the long-run operating performance of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-
backed IPOs during the period 1976-1988. They construct a matched sample of 272 VC-backed and non 
VC-backed  and compare the post-IPO operating performance measured by  return on assets,  cash 
flows/total assets, sales growth and capital expenditure growth. They find that VC-backed IPOs 
significantly outperform non-VC-backed ones for each of their measures over three years after the IPO 
date. 
 Brav and Gompers (1997) investigate the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs by looking at 
the cumulative abnormal stock returns on a sample of 934 VC-backed IPOs between 1972 and 1992. They 
construct the CAR measure using different benchmarks and find that the results critically depends on the 
methodology used. Finally, Tian (2012) compare the long run performances of VC syndicate backed IPOs 
with those of single VC-backed IPOs. He provides evidence that syndicates results in higher post IPO 
innovation as measured by number of patents granted as well as total number of citations. He also finds 
that VC syndicates are associated to better post IPO performances than single VC backed companies.  
In addition to covering a much more recent sample of IPOs that ends in December 2012, our paper differs 
from Tian’s in that we mainly focus on the diversity of VC syndicates as a consequence of an increased 
size.  
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
 The data  used  in this study are obtained from various sources including Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) New Issues, Dealogic, Venture Economics, Compustat, and CRSP. The sample is composed of 
VC-backed IPOs over the period January 1985- December 2012.  
IPO related measures come from SDC Platinum New Issues and are cross checked with Dealogic. 
In line with earlier studies, we eliminate financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities (SIC 
codes between 4900 and 4999), equity carve outs, foreign issues, depository offerings, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs), closed-end-fund investments, unit issues, leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and IPOs 
with offer price less than 5 dollars. We obtain supplementary company level characteristics such as 
company age at the time of IPO and underwriter bank reputation from Jay Ritter’s website1.  
We use Venture Economics to extract information about VC characteristics as well as their financing 
such as disclosed round amount, VC firm investment focus, VC firm affiliation and round number among 
                                                 
1 http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
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others. The record of venture-backed IPOs come from merging SDC New Issues with SDC Venture 
Economics tapes2. As highlighted by Tian (2011), there are some discrepancies between SDC and Venture 
Economics. Specifically, during the matching process, we identify several observations that SDC New 
Issues database mistakenly code as non-VC-backed for which we can in fact find corresponding round 
based financing records in Venture Economics. These observations are included in our final sample. 
Balance sheet data are collected from Compustat and return data are obtained from Center for 
Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP). After all filtering and merging, our final 
sample is composed of 1424 VC-backed IPOs of which 1159 are backed by VC syndicates (with the 
remaining backed by single VC). 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 VC syndicate size and IPO underpricing 
We start our analysis by investigating the relation between VC syndicate size and IPO underpricing. 
Hence, we test the following hypothesis. 
 H1: IPO underpricing is related to the size of the VC syndicate. 
To this purpose , we run the following OLS regression 3 
Underpricing = α + β1 VCSize + β2LeadVCRep + β3Log(Sales) +β4 Log(Age) 
+ β5 Log(Proceeds)  + β6 Rank + β7Nasdaq + β8Internet +β9 MarketReturn + β10 LockUp    +  
β11Above + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies                         (1) 
 The dependent variable in equation (1) is IPO Underpricing defined as 
OP
OPP −

100
1
 where, in line 
with most of the existing literature, P is the first available closing price after floatation and OP is the offering 
price4.  On the right hand side of equation (1), our variable of interest is VCSize. We use three different 
measures of syndicate size. Following Tian (2011), the first measure is VCtotal defined as  the sum of 
distinct VCs that provide financing to the firm until the IPO date. This measure however includes VCs 
that have exited prior to the IPO and so does not correctly reflect the number of VCs providing funds, and 
hence exercising control,  in any given round which for many companies in our sample change from round 
to round. In order to capture the round level dynamics of syndicate size, we construct a second measure 
                                                 
2 We perform matching by using Cusip numbers. For the observations that have missing Cusip, we carry out the matching 
with company names. 
3 A comprehensive list of the key variables used in our analysis can be found in Appendix A.  
4 Our underpricing measure comes directly from SDC. To calculate underpricing for missing values in SDC, we obtain first 
available closing price from CRSP 
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of  VC syndicate size defined as the average of the number of distinct VCs providing financing at each 
round until the IPO date which we denote by RoundVCSize. Finally we also use a dummy VCSizeLarge  
which takes value one if the RoundVCSize if above the sample median and zero otherwise. 5  
 Previous papers argue that more reputable lead VC are associated to more effective VC syndicate. 
Hence, to control for VC reputation, we take the reputation of the lead VC where the lead VC is defined, 
following Lee and Wahal (2004),  as the venture firm that makes the first investment across all financing 
rounds. Our reputation proxy, LeadVCRep, is then defined as the lead VC’s IPO market share during the 
three year period prior to the first investment round which, similar to Krishnan et al. (2010) and Nahata 
(2008), for a given IPO,  is constructed  as the aggregate net proceeds of all IPOs backed by the same lead 
VC normalized by the aggregate net proceeds of all VC backed IPOs over the three years prior to the first 
round of financing.  For example, if the portfolio company had received the first financing in 1994, then 
VC reputation measure is the ratio of total net proceeds from IPOs backed by the same lead VC between 
1991 and  1993 to the total net proceeds of all VC backed IPOs completed over the same years. In those 
cases where the portfolio company has multiple lead VCs, the reputation is taken to be the average 
reputation of all lead VCs. 6.    
 We also control for several firm’s characteristics known to affect underpricing such as the (log of) 
sales, company age, and IPO proceeds. We expect Age and Sales to be negatively correlated with IPO 
underpricing while Proceeds is usually positively related to the first day return.  
 We further include a number of variables to control for IPO characteristics that are known to affect 
underpricing.  Specifically, IPOs listed on the Nasdaq are expected to be smaller, riskier than average, and 
often from high-tech industries so in line with other papers (Corwin and Harris, 2001) we control for this 
by including in our regression a dummy variable Nasdaq which takes value one if the firm is listed on the 
Nasdaq and zero otherwise. We expect this dummy to have a positive coefficient.  Similarly, the variable 
Internet is a dummy that takes value one if the IPO firm is identified as an internet company in the database 
compiled by J. Ritter and zero otherwise and control for the fact that internet stocks are considered more 
uncertain and hence positively correlated to underpricing 
   The variable Rank denotes the lead underwriter’s rank which we obtain from Loughran and Ritter’s 
(2004) classification. The underwriter’s rank ranges from 1 to 9 with higher rank denoting more reputable 
underwriters. Generally, higher underwriter’s reputation should lower underpricing although the existing 
                                                 
5 The results do not change if the dummies defined with respect to the sample mean. 
6 The results are robust to alternative definitions of the lead VC such as the VC who makes the largest investment and also to 
a measure of IPO market share based on the number of IPOs conducted rather than the total proceeds. We also try a VC 
syndicate reputation measure constructed as the average IPO market share of all the distinct VCs financing the firm until the 
IPO date. Results remain unchanged. 
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evidence is mixed .We also control for the lock up period as it has been argued in the literature that 
underpricing can be exploited by insiders to build momentum so that when the lock up expires they can 
liquidate their shares at a higher price.  The variable LockUp  thus indicated the length of the lock up 
period in days. The variable Above is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the IPO is priced above the 
top of the range and zero otherwise. It captures hot IPOs that are usually associated with higher 
underpricing. 
 Finally, we control for market and industry conditions by including industry dummies, year 
dummies and the variable MarketReturn defined as the mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the 
month before the issue date (Loughran and Ritter, 2004)..  
   
4.2 VC Diversity and IPO underpricing 
 VCs differ  along many different dimensions such as age, location and type.   Diverse VCs may 
have mis-aligned objectives which would exacerbate internal agency conflicts. It is possible then that it is 
not size per se that causes a syndicate to be dysfunctional but rather the fact that as size increases so does 
the diversity of the syndicate.  In order to investigate this link we test the following second hypothesis: 
 
      H2:  IPO underpricing is related to  the degree of diversity of the VC syndicate. 
 
We do so by running regression (1) where VCsize is replaced by VCdiveristy. We capture the diversity of 
a VC syndicate by constructing a diversity index based on four different VCs characteristics: age, country 
of origin, industry preferences and affiliation and using two different approaches. The first proxy is a 
composite index constructed, similarly to Chahine et al. (2012), by counting the total number of different 
affiliations and industry preferences represented in the syndicate. To identify the type of affiliation, we 
use the affiliation classification compiled by Venture Economics which categorizes VCs in 14 different 
affiliations.7 Similarly, we rely on the industry classification defined by Venture Economics which 
recognizes 62 different industries. We are not able to identify the industry preferences of all the VCs in 
our sample.  As a matter of fact 682 out of the 3512  distinct VCs which make an investment at any given 
round do not have any industry preferences. There are also additional 242 VCs whose industry preference 
is labeled as unknown.8. As for age, we partition our sample of distinct VCs in four different age brackets 
and we then count how many age brackets are represented in each syndicate. The four brackets  are (0-5; 
                                                 
7 We are aware that previous papers (Hellmann et al., 2008 and Chemmanur et al., 2013) suggests that VentureXpert misreport 
the affiliation of many VCs particularly for corporate and bank affiliated VCs. However we thing that in any thing the 
misclassification is playing against us by underestimating the affiliation-related diversity of the syndicate. 
8 Removing these two types of groups from our sample does not change our results.  
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6-13; 14-24; 25+) so if in a given syndicates there are only VCs belonging to the range (0-5) and (25+) 
we assign that syndicate an age score equal to  2.  Finally for each VC we also identify the country of 
origin. There are 33 different countries in our sample so for each round we count the number of distinct 
countries represented. We then assign the syndicate a country score equal to the average of this number 
across all financing rounds. Our diversity index, VCDivIndex,  is finally obtained as the sum of each 
individual score.  
Our second diversity index is constructed by employing Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA has 
the advantage, compared to the composite index, to identify a diversity score able to explain more variance 
and is particularly suited in our case where all the four VC characteristics used are highly correlated. The 
PCA analysis will generate a number of components equal to the number of variables used and the first 
principal component identified accounts for most of the variance in the data, the second component for 
the second largest and so on so forth. Only components accounting for maximal variance are retained 
which are those with eigenvalues larger than one.  We label this second diversity proxy as  VCDivPCA.  
Finally, we also use a third diversity measure defined as a dummy variable VCDivHIGH which takes 
value 1 if the syndicate has a diversity index above the sample median and zero otherwise. 9 
 
4.3. Controlling for Endogeneity: Instrumental Variable and  2SLS 
A potential limitation of our OLS analysis is that the decision to syndicate might not be exogenous 
but rather affected by firm level characteristics.  
A first raw test to verify whether our analysis is indeed biased due to an endogeneity problem we re-
run our OLS regression removing from the sample single VC backed IPOs. In this way, we are de facto 
removing the decision to syndicate. We show that our results do not change if we do so and we interpret 
that as an indication that our analysis does not suffer from a strong endogeneity problem. 
However, it might still be the case that the size and the diversity of any given syndicate are not 
random. In order to deal with this problem, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach in a 2SLS 
regression. Similar to Chahine et al. (2012), our instrument of choice is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 if the VC firms is located in California or Massachusetts and zero otherwise. The rationale behind this 
choice is that firms located near VC clusters are more likely to be backed by more and more diverse VCs.  
We thus run the following first stage regression to determine the VC syndicate size (diversity)  
 VCSize(Diversity) = α + β1 VC_Cluster + β2LeadVCRep + β3Log(Sales) +β4 Log(Age) 
                                                 
9 Results are robust if we define the dummy with respect ot the sample mean.  
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+ β5 Log(Proceeds)  + β6 Rank + β7Nasdaq + β8Internet +β9 MarketReturn + β10 LockUp    +  β11Above 
+ Industry Dummies + Year Dummies                     (2) 
  
 Where VC_Cluster is our instrument and the rest of the controls are the same as in the previous 
regressions. The predicted value of VCsize(Diversity) obtained from the first stage regression is then 
replaced to our variable of interest into the second stage regression that is otherwise the same as the OLS 
regression in equation (1).   
  
4.4. VC syndicate size and long-run firm performance 
As previously discussed evidence shows that VC firms tend to maintain significant equity holdings 
as well as seats in the board long after the IPO is completed. In fact even where VCs do not seat on board 
they do however influence the appointment of directors. This is the kind of decisions that would become 
more complicated if they had to be agreed by a larger number of very diverse VCs.  
The last step of our analysis is hence to assess the effect of VC syndicate size and diversity on the long 
term performances of the portfolio companies that are taken public. Our hypothesis is: 
 
   H3: The long-run performances of VC-backed IPOs depend on the size and diversity of the  VC 
syndicate.  
 In order to test the above hypothesis we run the following regression:  
LTperform =  α + β1 VCSize(Diversity) + β2LeadVCRep + β3Log(Sales) +β4 Log(Age) 
+ β5 Log(Proceeds)  + β6 Rank + β7Nasdaq + β8Internet +β9 MarketReturn + β10 LockUp    +  β11Above 
+ Industry Dummies + Year Dummies                                                  (3) 
 
Where we employ operating as well as stock performance indicators. The first measure is the 
industry adjusted average  earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to the firm’s total 
assets ratio, EBITDA/TA , over the three years following the IPO.10  The second proxy is the firm’s Tobin 
Q defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is equal to the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the number of 
                                                 
10 In order to adjust the ratio  for possible industry effects we identify for each IPO firm its industry classification based on the 
Fama-French 48 industry categorization. Then we calculate the median EBITDA/TA for each industry group and subtract these 
median values from the EBITDA/TA ratio of each sample firm in that industry.  
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shares outstanding times the market price. We then take the average of the Tobin’s Q values calculated at 
1, 2 and 3 years after the IPO date. Finally we also look at long term stock price performances by 
measuring the firm’s  value weighted industry adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the three 
years after the IPO date. CARs are constructed as follows. For a given IPO firm i, the CAR is defined 
as  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑛 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is  the abnormal return of firm i in month t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)  
represents the expected return and it is replaced by value weighted market return based on the NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq indices obtained from WRDS over the three years period preceding the IPO date .  
In the next section we present and discuss our findings.  
   
5. Results 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
 The distribution of VC-backed IPOs over the sample period (1985-2012) is presented in Panel A of 
Table 1. It appears clear that the number of issues is not evenly distributed across the sample period. Not 
surprisingly, the peak of the IPO activity takes place during the internet bubble years, followed by a 
slowdown in the subsequent years.  The Dotcom period has a total of 371 IPOs, covering approximately 
20 percent of the full sample and during this period there is also the largest proportion of VC backed IPOs.  
More interestingly for the purpose of our analysis, overall  more than 81% of the aggregate number of VC 
backed IPOs are backed by multiple VCs. 
  Panel B reports the distribution of VC-backed IPOs and average syndicate size across 12 different 
industries. The industry classification is based on Fama-French 12 industry groups. As before, we note 
that the IPO distribution is not homogeneous across industries as the largest share of IPOs belong to high-
tech and healthcare / medical industries.  
  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
  Panel A in Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. As far as our variables of interest are concerned, we find that the mean (median) syndicate size 
is 5.25 (4).  The mean (median) of the round level VC size is smaller and equal to 2.70 (2.29). As for the 
diversity index, we note that the mean(median) is 7 (7.69) but there is a higher volatility. 
 Panel B in Table 2 provides summary statistics for small and large syndicates and a difference in 
means test for all relevant variables. A VC syndicate is deemed to be large when its round level VC size 
is below the mean value of 3. The table highlights a significant difference in the size of underpricing which 
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appears to be 8% smaller in companies backed by small VC syndicates and the difference is statistically 
significant at 1%.   
Large VC syndicates also seem to be more involved in  younger and smaller companies - when 
looking at the value of sales and total assets - than small VC syndicates. These differences are also 
statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that the larger underpricing associated with firms backed by 
larger VC syndicates might in fact be the consequence of these companies being on average riskier than 
those backed by small VC syndicates. We do  take this into account in our empirical analysis by including 
control variables that capture the firm’s riskiness. 
Finally in Panel C of Table 2 we report  the outcome of the PCA analysis based on the four VC 
characteristics age, type, affiliation and country of origin. The result shows that only the first principal 
component satisfies the selection criterion that requires the eigenvalue to be larger than one and also 
explains over 65% of the total variance. Hence we retain only that component to be employed as  diversity 
proxy in our analysis.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
  5.2  Syndicate size, diversity and IPO performance 
 Table 3 reports the results of a baseline OLS regression where the dependent variable is IPO 
underpricing and controlling for each of our measures of size and diversity. The regression outcome shows 
that  the coefficient estimates of all of our variables of interest are of the expected sign and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level. The economic magnitude of the impact is also relevant as an increase of 1 
VC in the round level syndicate size leads to an increase of almost 2 per cent of the underpricing. Results 
are similar for diversity. Looking at the two dummies VCDivHigh and VCSizeLarge provides a  more 
intuitive interpretation of the economic significance of the results as large syndicates appear to be 6 per 
cent more underpriced than small syndicates and the same holds for more diverse syndicate as opposed to 
less diverse syndicates. 
With regard to the other explanatory variables, the results show that the coefficient estimates of the 
company age and the log of net proceeds have the expected sign and are statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. Also in line with previous papers we find that Above has a strong positive and significant  impact 
on underpricing.   
Table 4 performs the same OLS regression on the sample of only syndicate backed IPOs, that is excluding 
IPOs backed by one VC. The results remains qualitatively the same although the economic magnitude of 
the effect of our variables of interest become larger.  
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 Overall the results presented in Table 3 and 4 provide initial support to our conjecture that 
underpricing is positively correlated to VC syndicate size and diversity. However, as discussed above, our 
findings could  be biased by the potential endogeneity of our variables of interest. Before drawing any 
more conclusion we need to address the endogeneity problem which we do in the next Section. 
 
<Insert Table 3 and 4 here> 
 
5.3 Endogenous VC syndicate size 
We explained in the previous section that the decision to syndicate might not be exogenous. We 
address this problem in two different ways. Firstly, we re-run our OLS regression by removing from our 
sample the single VC backed IPOs which were instead included in the previous analysis so that we no 
longer have to worry about the syndication decision as our sample only includes syndicated backed IPOs 
which are 1159 in our full sample or 82 per cent of the total sample.  
The OLS results for this new sample are reported in table 4 and are very much in line with those 
presented in Table 3 with the coefficient estimates of all of our variables of interest exhibiting a stronger 
economic significance than before. This provides some preliminary indication that our OLS analysis does 
not suffer from a serious endogeneity problem. 
However, to ascertain this further we conduct a 2SLS regression based on Equation (2). Results for 
the first and second stage are presented in Table 4.   Column (1) report the  first stage result when our 
dependent variables are VCSize and RoundVCSize and shows that our instrument, VC_Cluster, has a  
strong explanatory power of our proxies of size and diversity. In Columns (3) and (4) we report the second 
stage where our variables of interest  have been replaced with the predicted value obtained from stage 1. 
As we can see the results are in line with the OLS one although the magnitude of the coefficient is larger.  
In the remaining Columns (4) to (6) we present the 2SLS result for our diversity proxies VCDivIndex and 
VCDivPCA which, like the size proxies, confirm the OLS results. At the bottom of the table we include 
the output of  the Stock-Yogo test and the Sargan-Hansen Endogeneity Test which together confirm the 
validity of the instrument employed but also indicate a relatively mild endogeneity problem. 
Reassured by these results,  in the rest of our analysis we will focus on the OLS regressions on the sample 
of syndicated backed IPOs only. 11  
 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
                                                 
11 For brevity we do not report the 2SLS results for our dummies VCDivHigh and VCSizeLarge but they are in line with the 
others. They available from the authors upon request.  
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 5.4  Post- IPO Performance of syndicates 
In this section, we discuss the result of our analysis for post-IPO performances. The aim is to 
understand whether the inefficiencies associated to large and diverse VC syndicates might have a long 
lasting impact on the investee companies and therefore translate in poorer long term performances. 
We employ three different measures of long term performances. Table 6 reports the results of the 
OLS regression where the dependent variable is the average of the (median industry adjusted) 
EBITDA/TA over the three years period after the IPO date which provide support to our hypothesis that 
larger and more diverse syndicates do negatively impact on the long term performances of their portfolio 
companies long after the IPOs. The coefficient estimates of all our variables of interest have the predicted 
negative sign and are statistically significant. Larger and more diverse syndicates appear to have an 
EBITDA/TA ratio approximately 2.5 per cent smaller than smaller and more homogeneous syndicates.  
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
These finding are further confirmed by regression results in Table 7 where the dependent variable is 
now the firm’s average Tobin’s Q over the three years after the IPO date. The economic significance of 
the effect is substantial as larger and more diverse syndicates appear to have an average Tobin’s Q 
approximately 30 per cent smaller and this is statistically significant at 5 per cent level.  
 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
 
Finally, in Table 8 we present the results of the regression where the dependent variable is the firm’s 
value weighted CAR over the three years after the IPO date.  As in the other cases, the coefficient estimates 
of all of our variables of interest is negative as predicted by our hypothesis, statistically significant  and 
with an economic significance that suggests that larger and more diverse syndicates underperform smaller 
and less diverse syndicate by approximately 20 per cent.  
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
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All the findings of the long term analysis together provide strong support to our conjecture which 
are consistent with the analysis of the short term performance. 12 
 
5.5 VC Syndicate size and IPO valuation 
Some papers (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Chemmanur et al. 2013, Tian, 2011) challenge the 
suitability of underpricing as a measure of short term IPO performances on the ground that the underlying 
assumption that the secondary market price converges to the firm’s intrinsic value immediately after the start of 
trading might in fact not hold in reality. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) document that the equity of IPO 
firms is generally overvalued (relative to the intrinsic value) at the time of the IPO and this overvaluation increases 
during the first trading day. Consistently, Chemmanur et al. (2013) argue that the larger underpricing observed by 
VC backed IPOs might in fact be the consequence of a larger overvaluation over the intrinsic value at the IPO date. 
Hence they claim that an analysis of VC backed IPOs only based on underpricing can be misleading and suggest 
instead to complement it by also looking at the IPO valuation.  
Following their argument, in this Section we extend  our analysis of short term performances by using the IPO 
valuation as our dependent variable instead of IPO underpricing. IPO valuation is constructed following the 
methodology pioneered by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004).13 For each IPO firm, we first calculate the price 
multiples based on EBITDA as follows: 
(
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)
𝐼𝑃𝑂
=
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
 
We also look at price multiples of sample firms using secondary market price rather than offer price. That is, 
our second set of price multiples take the form: 
(
𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)
𝐼𝑃𝑂
=
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
 
Our next step is to match each IPO firm with a comparable industry peer that is already public. The price 
multiples for public companies take the form: 
                                                 
12 All the results of this section remain unchanged if we analyse the long term performance year by year instead of taking the 
average over the three year period after the IPO date and are available from the authors upon request.   
13 Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) exclude sample firms with negative earnings. Doing this significantly 
reduces our sample to its half but results stay qualitatively similar.  
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(
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
)
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
=
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
 
 The matching is done based on the Propensity score along  several dimensions. Firstly, the matching requires 
the matched firm to be in the same Fama-French 48 industry as the sample IPO firm. Secondly, matched firms have 
similar sales, return on assets (ROA), profit margin (EBITDA/Sale) and sale growth (mean three year future sales 
normalized by the sale in the given year). Finally, for each fiscal year we obtain propensity scores by running the 
following Logit regression:  
𝑃(𝕀𝑖𝑝𝑜)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
Where dependent variable, 𝕀𝑖𝑝𝑜, is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the given firm i goes to public in the 
given year t. Then, the predicted values from the regression above provide us the propensity scores. After generating 
propensity scores for sample firms and their industry peers, we find the matched firms by minimizing the difference 
between predicted scores. We then run the OLS and 2SLS as in equations (1) and (2) but using the following IPO 
valuation proxies as dependent variables:  
(
𝑃
𝑉
) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (|
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴)𝐼𝑃𝑂
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴)𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑
|  )  𝑜𝑟 (
𝑀𝑃
𝑉
) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (|
(𝑆𝑀 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴)𝐼𝑃𝑂
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴)𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑
|) 
 
Table 9 reports the OLS results obtained by using (P/V) as our measure of IPO valuation and are generally 
consistent with the results on underpricing to the extent that they show that larger and more diverse VC syndicates 
negatively impact on the IPO firm’s valuation.  
< Insert Table 9 here > 
5.6 Robustness tests 
In the VC literature fund size, defined as the logarithm of fund size in million dollars, has been also 
associated to the valuation of portfolio firms (Cumming and Dai, 2011). To control for the possible effect 
of fund size, we re-run our regression including fund size as defined in Cumming and Dai (2011) but the 
control variable is never significant and it does not impact on the significance of our variables of interest. 
Similarly, the distance between the lead VC and the portfolio company has been shown to potentially 
affect the performance of VC investments (Cumming and Dai, 2010). We try to control for the effect of 
distance by constructing a dummy Distance that takes value 1 if the portfolio company shares the same 
zip code as the lead VC and 0 otherwise. We are able to construct this variable only for 980 firms in our 
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sample.  We do find that distance increases underpricing but has no effect on long term performance but 
it does not impact on any of our variables of interest .  
In a more recent paper Cumming and Dai (2012) also shows that it is not uncommon for the lead VC to 
change over the course of the investment. They show that switching lead VC can affect capitals flow and 
the firm future valuation. In our analysis, we already control for several measure of lead VC reputation 
which is never significant, however to further control for the possible impact of switching lead VC we 
construct a dummy variable Switch which takes value 1 if the lead VC has switched at least once between 
the first round of financing and the IPO date, and zero otherwise. Almost fifty per cent of our sample 
switches lead VC at least once, however including this control in our regressions does not alter our results 
and it does not appear to have a significant effect on IPO performance. 
Finally a limitation of our analysis is that,  due to lack of data, we cannot control for the VC ownership 
which could intuitively play a role as size and diversity might matter only when VCs have a large share 
of ownership. We attempt to partially overcome this limitation  by constructing a proxy of ownership 
defined as the ratio of the total amount of VC funding until the IPO date to the IPO firm’s total assets. We 
then split our sample based on median value of this proxy, which is 11% , into LOW and HIGH ownership 
subsamples and we  run our OLS regressions on these subsamples separately.    The results show that the 
effect of size and diversity remain qualitatively similar but consistently with our expectations the 
economic magnitude of the effect is larger in the HIGH ownership subsample. 14 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The vast literature on venture capital financing has extensively addressed the question of why 
venture capitalists syndicate deals. While the benefits of syndication are generally well understood, i.e. 
risk sharing and complementary expertise, there is still very little understanding of the cost associated to 
syndication and more importantly of when and how, if at all, they impact on the performances of their 
portfolio companies.  
This paper sheds some light on this particular aspect of venture capital financing by exploring the effect 
of size and diversity of VC syndicates on the IPO and post-IPO performances of their investee companies.  
VC syndicates are not static. On the contrary their size and composition changes over time which is 
something that the empirical literature so far has not properly accounted for. By constructing several 
                                                 
14 For the sake of brevity, the results of the robustness tests are omitted but available from the authors upon request.  
22 
 
measures of size and diversity we try to capture the dynamics of the composition of VC syndicates and 
address the question of whether larger and more diverse VC syndicates are more likely to suffer from 
coordination problems and internal agency conflicts that ultimately result in a negative impact on the IPO 
performance of their portfolio companies.  
We employ multiple measures of short and long term IPO performances to test our conjecture. Aafter 
controlling for possible endogeneity problems and several other factors that can affect our dependent 
variables,  we provide strong evidence in support of our hypothesis that indeed IPO firms backed by larger 
and more diverse VC syndicates underperform those backed by smaller and less diverse syndicates in the 
short and in the long term and that this underperformance has a significant economic magnitude.  
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  Table 1. Sample distribution over time and industry 
 
Panel A: All VC (Multiple VC) backed IPO frequencies by year 
 
 
Year 
Number of  All 
VC(Multiple 
VC) 
backed IPOs 
Mean VC 
(Multiple VC)  
Syndicate Size 
 Year 
Number of  All 
VC(Multiple 
VC) 
backed IPOs 
Mean VC 
(Multiple VC)  
Syndicate Size 
1985 11 (7) 4.64 (6.71)  1999 162 (141) 5.05 (5.65) 
1986 44 (37) 7.50 (8.73)  2000 154 (138) 5.60 (6.14) 
1987 39 (33) 7.97 (9.24)  2001 22 (17) 3.27 (3.94) 
1988 18 (17) 7.94 (8.35)  2002 25 (16) 3.60 (5.06) 
1989 20 (14) 6.65 (9.07)  2003 15 (15)  5.33 (5.33) 
1990 24 (17) 5.38 (7.18)  2004 50 (41) 6.16 (7.29) 
1991 61 (50) 6.41 (7.60)  2005 32 (19) 3.78 (5.68) 
1992 83 (66) 6.42 (7.82)  2006 34 (29) 4.29 (4.86) 
1993 92 (76) 5.84 (6.86)  2007 46 (39) 4.89 (5.59) 
1994 55 (43) 4.11 (4.98)  2008 5 (5) 4.40 (4.40) 
1995 99 (74) 4.82 (6.11)  2009 9 (5) 4.56 (7.40) 
1996 128 (97) 4.13 (5.13)  2010 22 (19) 4.82 (5.42) 
1997 76 (60) 4.13 (4.97)  2011 22 (20) 6.23 (6.75) 
1998 49 (38) 4.24 (5.18)  2012 27 (26) 5.11 (5.27) 
   
 
Total 1424 (1159) 5.25 (6.22) 
    
 
Panel B: All VC (Multiple VC) backed IPO frequencies by industry 
 
Industry Classification Number of  All 
VC(Multiple 
VC) 
backed IPOs 
Mean VC 
(Multiple VC)  
Syndicate 
Size 
  Consumer Non-Durables 29 (17) 3.52 (5.29) 
  Consumer Durables 9 (7) 2.89 (3.43) 
  Manufacturing 36 (21) 3.75 (5.71) 
  Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction 11 (8) 2.45 (3.00) 
  Chemicals and Allied Products 13 (10) 6.69 (8.40) 
  Business Equipment 693 (588) 5.52 (6.33) 
  Telephone and Television Transmission  71 (55) 4.72 (5.80) 
  Utilities   
  Wholesale, Retail and Services 106 (76) 3.93 (5.09) 
  Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 312 (274) 6.20 (6.92) 
  Finance   
  Others- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels. 144 (103) 4.09 (5.32) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A:  Full sample summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of 1424 VC-backed IPOs completed during 1985-2012. Underpricing is defined by 
the ratio of difference between first available closing stock price and offer price to offer price and divided by 100. VCTotal is 
the number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. RoundVCSize is the mean number of distinct VCs that 
provide capital per round. VCDivIndex is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. 
private, investment bank or corporate VC), (ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different nationalities of 
participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC firms. VCDivPCA is the principal component calculated based on four 
dimensions that we used for computing diversity index. VCLarge is one if the diversity index of the syndicate is larger than 4, 
the median of the sample. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment 
round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. Age is the 
difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms 
of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is 
identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and 
zero otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date.  
Above takes value one if the IPO is priced above the original filing price range and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Min Median Mean Std Dev Max 
Underpricing -0.99 0.11 0.26 0.42 2.29 
VCTotal 1.00 4.00 5.25 4.31 26.00 
RoundVCSize  1.00 2.29 2.70 1.66 7.67 
VCDivIndex 3.00 7.00 7.69 3.52 26.50 
VCDivPCA -2.11 -0.31 0.00 1.62 8.89 
Total Assets 
(MM$) 
0.28 20.93 93.82 535.28 16915.00 
LeadVCRep (%) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.12 
Sales (MM$) 0.00 19.23 78.56 344.14 10079.00 
Age 0.00 7.00 10.30 13.05 117.00 
Proceeds (MM$) 2.20 37.20 66.29 423.36 15830.80 
Rank 1.00 8.13 8.01 1.42 9.00 
Internet 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.38 1.00 
Nasdaq 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.35 1.00 
Lock-up 15.00 180.00 181.35 42.78 730.00 
Market Return -0.58 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.58 
Above 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.42 1.00 
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Panel B: Summary statistics for two subsamples 
 
Variable Small 
Syndicates 
Large 
Syndicates 
Differences in 
means 
Underpricing 0.23 0.32  -0.09*** 
VCTotal 3.27 9.20 -5.93*** 
RoundVCSize 1.73 4.63 -2.90*** 
VCDivIndex 5.70 11.65 -5.95*** 
VCDivPCA -0.88 1.76 -2.64*** 
Total Assets (MM$) 117.5 46.44. 71.06*** 
LeadVCRep (%) 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Sales (MM$) 99.93 35.85 64.08*** 
Age 11.80 7.30 4.50*** 
Proceeds (MM$) 72.49 53.89 18.60 
Rank 7.88 8.28 -0.40*** 
Internet 0.16 0.20 -0.04** 
Nasdaq 0.84 0.88 -0.04** 
Lock-up 182.4 179.2 3.20 
Market Return 0.06 0.05 0.01 
Above 0.22 0.20 -0.02 
Num. of obs. 949 475  
 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample firms that are backed by small or large VC syndicates. If the mean 
VC syndicate size per round is less than or equal to 3, then the syndicate is coded as Small Syndicate. Otherwise, it is labeled 
as Large Syndicate. Last column reports the differences in means. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented 
by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Panel C. Principal Component Analysis 
 
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.61124402 1.87452839 0.6528 0.6528 
2 0.73671563 0.21968790 0.1842 0.8370 
3 0.51702773 0.38201511 0.1293 0.9662 
4 0.13501262   0.0338 1.0000 
 
Eigenvectors 
  Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4 
VC Firm Nationality 0.375405 0.926033 -.009187 0.038074 
VC Firm Age 0.573469 -.204206 -.258590 -.750043 
VC Firm Industry 0.548178 -.253475 -.463933 0.648087 
VC Firm Type 0.479275 -.191084 0.847238 0.126370 
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Table 3.  OLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size and diversity on IPO underpricing  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 
-0.258** 
(0.102) 
-0.268*** 
(0.102) 
-0.286*** 
(0.102) 
-0.305*** 
(0.103) 
-0.232** 
(0.102) 
-0.269*** 
(0.102) 
-0.269*** 
(0.103) 
VCTotal 
 
0.006*** 
(0.003)   
   
RoundVCSize 
  
0.018*** 
(0.006)  
   
VCDivIndex 
 
 
 0.010*** 
(0.003)  
  
VCDivPCA 
    
0.021*** 
(0.006)  
 
VCSizeLarge 
     
0.058*** 
(0.021)  
VCDivHigh 
      
0.060*** 
(0.021) 
LeadVCRep 
-0.589 
(0.389) 
-0.596 
(0.388) 
-0.627 
(0.388) 
-0.619 
(0.389) 
-0.605 
(0.388) 
-0.644* 
(0.387) 
-0.641* 
(0.387) 
Log Sales 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.01 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Log Age  
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
Log Proceeds 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
Rank 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Internet 
0.132*** 
(0.039) 
0.129*** 
(0.039) 
0.129*** 
(0.039) 
0.130*** 
(0.039) 
0.130*** 
(0.039) 
0.131*** 
(0.039) 
0.130*** 
(0.039) 
Nasdaq 
0.013 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
Lockup 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Market Return 
0.217*** 
(0.067) 
0.225*** 
(0.067) 
0.225*** 
(0.067) 
0.225*** 
(0.067) 
0.227*** 
(0.067) 
0.223*** 
(0.067) 
0.223*** 
(0.067) 
Above 
0.330*** 
(0.029) 
0.330 
(0.029) 
0.330 
(0.029) 
0.331 
(0.029) 
0.331 
(0.029) 
0.329 
(0.029) 
0.329 
(0.029) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Numb. of obs. 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 
 
This table reports baseline OLS results where dependent variable is underpricing. VCTotal is the number of distinct VCs that 
provide capital before the IPO date. RoundVCSize is the mean number of distinct VCs that provide capital per round. 
VCDivIndex is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or 
corporate VC), (ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) 
age brackets of VC firms. VCDivPCA is the principal component calculated based on four dimensions that we used for 
computing diversity index. VCSizeLarge is one if the mean VC syndicate size per round is greater than or equal to the median 
of the sample. VCDivHigh is one if the diversity index of the syndicate is larger than 8.3, the median of the sample. 
LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Sales stand for 
company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. Age is the difference between 
year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. 
Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as 
internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero 
otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Above 
takes value one if the IPO is priced above the original filing price range and zero otherwise. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 4.  OLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size on underpricing [only syndicate 
backed IPOs] 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 
-0.337*** 
(0.123) 
-0.335*** 
(0.123) 
-0.363*** 
(0.124) 
-0.384*** 
(0.124) 
-0.300** 
(0.124) 
-0.346*** 
(0.123) 
-0.345*** 
(0.124) 
VCTotal 
 
0.007*** 
(0.003)   
   
RoundVCSize 
  
0.020*** 
(0.007)  
   
VCDivIndex 
 
 
 0.011*** 
(0.003)  
  
VCDivPCA 
    
0.023*** 
(0.007)  
 
VCSizeLarge 
     
0.060*** 
(0.023)  
VCDivHigh 
      
0.062*** 
(0.022) 
LeadVCRep 
-0.582 
(0.451) 
-0.568 
(0.451) 
-0.618 
(0.451) 
-0.606 
(0.453) 
-0.586 
(0.452) 
-0.640 
(0.449) 
-0.632 
(0.448) 
Log Sales 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Log Age  
-0.037** 
(0.018) 
-0.039** 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
Log Proceeds 
0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.063*** 
(0.020) 
Rank 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Internet 
0.114*** 
(0.042) 
0.111*** 
(0.042) 
0.114*** 
(0.042) 
0.114*** 
(0.042) 
0.114*** 
(0.042) 
0.115*** 
(0.042) 
0.115*** 
(0.042) 
Nasdaq 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
Lockup 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Market Return 
0.241*** 
(0.077) 
0.251*** 
(0.077) 
0.250*** 
(0.077) 
0.249*** 
(0.077) 
0.253*** 
(0.077) 
0.247*** 
(0.077) 
0.248*** 
(0.077) 
Above 
0.331*** 
(0.033) 
0.333*** 
(0.033) 
0.333*** 
(0.033) 
0.335*** 
(0.033) 
0.334*** 
(0.033) 
0.331*** 
(0.033) 
0.331*** 
(0.033) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Numb. of obs. 1159 1159 1159 1159 1159 1159 1159 
 
This table reports baseline OLS results where dependent variable is underpricing. VCTotal is the number of distinct VCs that 
provide capital before the IPO date. RoundVCSize is the mean number of distinct VCs that provide capital per round. VCDivIndex 
is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC), 
(ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC 
firms. VCDivPCA is the principal component calculated based on four dimensions that we used for computing diversity index. 
VCSizeLarge is one if the mean VC syndicate size per round is greater than or equal to the median of the sample. VCDivHigh is 
one if the diversity index of the syndicate is larger than 8.3, the median of the sample. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market 
share during the three-year period before the first investment round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company 
sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the 
company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank 
classification. Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. 
Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted 
CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. Above takes value one if the IPO is priced above the original filing price 
range and zero otherwise. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively.         
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Table 5.  2SLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size and diversity  on IPO underpricing 
 
 First Stage 
VCSize 
 
Second Stage 
Underpricing 
 
Second Stage 
Underpricing 
First Stage 
VCDivIndex 
Second Stage 
Underpricing 
Second Stage 
Underpricing 
Intercept 
0.747 
(1.375) 
-0.296*** 
(0.105) 
-0.376*** 
(0.118) 
4.469*** 
(1.156) 
-0.446*** 
(0.138) 
-0.142 
(0.117) 
VCTotal 
 0.023** 
(0.01)  
   
RoundVCSize 
  0.075** 
(0.033) 
   
VCDivIndex 
    0.038** 
(0.017)  
VCDivPCA 
 
  
 
 
0.090** 
(0.040) 
VC_Cluster 
1.925*** 
(0.233)   
1.164*** 
(0.184)   
LeadVCRep 
-0.528 
(6.458) 
-0.615 
(0.396) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
2.237 
(4.914) 
-0.711* 
(0.415) 
-0.657 
(0.415) 
Log Sales 
-0.248*** 
(0.071) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
-0.255*** 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Log Age  
0.023 
(0.185) 
-0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.058*** 
(0.017) 
-0.549*** 
(0.128) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
Log Proceeds 
0.028 
(0.206) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.183) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
0.055*** 
(0.017) 
Rank 
0.389*** 
(0.084) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
0.121*** 
(0.039) 
0.465*** 
(0.069) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
Internet 
0.364 
(0.345) 
0.122*** 
(0.039) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
0.195 
(0.266) 
0.123*** 
(0.039) 
0.122*** 
(0.039) 
Nasdaq 
0.049 
(0.372) 
0.010 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.129 
(0.302) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
Lockup 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.253*** 
(0.069) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Market Return 
-1.333* 
(0.757) 
0.249*** 
(0.068) 
0.332*** 
(0.029) 
-0.790 
(0.615) 
0.249*** 
(0.069) 
0.262*** 
(0.07) 
Above 
-0.237 
(0.271) 
0.332*** 
(0.029) 
0.075** 
(0.033) 
-0.245 
(0.220) 
0.335*** 
(0.029) 
0.335*** 
(0.029) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.18 0.39 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.38 
Stock - Yogo 
Weak Identification Test 
 67.96*** 46.23***  39.74*** 32.87*** 
Sargan-Hansen 
Endogeneity Test 
 3.27* 3.43*  3.35* 3.52* 
Numb. of obs. 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 
 
 
This table shows first and second stage of 2SLS regressions where VC_Cluster is our instrument and  VCTotal, RoundVCSize, 
VCDivIndex and VCDivPCA are predicted values from the first stage regressions. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share 
during the three-year period before the first investment round. Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of 
date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter 
underwriter rank classification. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise. Internet is equal to one 
if the IPO firm is identified as  internet company in the database compiled by J. Ritter. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 6.  OLS regressions for the impact of  VC syndicate size and diversity on post-IPO 
profitability measured by EBITDA/Total Assets 
 
Variable EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Intercept 
-0.236*** 
(0.075) 
-0.221*** 
(0.076) 
-0.212*** 
(0.076) 
-0.248*** 
(0.076) 
-0.227*** 
(0.075) 
-0.230*** 
(0.075) 
VCTotal 
-0.005*** 
(0.002)  
    
RoundVCSize 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
    
VCDivIndex 
  
-0.005*** 
(0.002)  
  
VCDivPCA 
   
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
  
VCSizeLarge 
    
-0.027** 
(0.012)  
VCDivHigh 
     
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
LeadVCRep 
-0.142 
(0.272) 
-0.105 
(0.272) 
-0.112 
(0.273) 
-0.117 
(0.273) 
-0.112 
(0.272) 
-0.111 
(0.275) 
Log Sales 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
0.068*** 
(0.006) 
Log Age  
0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
Log Proceeds 
-0.03*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
Rank 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
Internet 
-0.07*** 
(0.021) 
-0.07*** 
(0.021) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
Nasdaq 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
Lockup 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Market 
Return 
-0.083* 
(0.044) 
-0.079* 
(0.044) 
-0.079* 
(0.044) 
-0.081* 
(0.044) 
-0.076* 
(0.044) 
-0.076* 
(0.044) 
Underpricing 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
Industry 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Numb. of obs. 901 901 901 901 901 901 
 
Dependent variables are industry adjusted return mean EBITDA/Total Assets during the three-year period after the IPO date. 
VCTotal is the number of distinct VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. We drop single VC backed IPOs from the 
sample. RoundVCSize is the mean number of distinct VCs that provide capital per round. VCDivIndex is an index which is total 
number of (i) different VC types within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC), (ii) different industry 
preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC firms. VCDivPCA 
is the principal component calculated based on four dimensions that we used for computing diversity index. VCSizeLarge is 
one if the mean VC syndicate size per round is greater than or equal to the median of the sample. VCDivHigh is one if the 
diversity index of the syndicate is larger than 8.3, the median of the sample. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
represented by ***, **, and * respectively.        
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Table 7. OLS regressions for the impact of VC syndicate size and diversity on Tobin’s Q 
Variable Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 
5.749*** 
(1.640) 
5.871*** 
(1.652) 
5.977*** 
(1.660) 
5.577*** 
(1.614) 
5.804*** 
(1.640) 
5.779*** 
(1.640) 
VCTotal 
-0.027* 
(0.015)  
    
RoundVCSize 
 
-0.092** 
(0.047) 
    
VCDivIndex 
  
-0.049** 
(0.021)  
  
VCDivPCA 
   
-0.119** 
(0.048) 
  
VCSizeLarge 
    
-0.336** 
(0.145)  
VCDivHigh 
     
-0.295** 
(0.144) 
LeadVCRep 
2.053 
(2.945) 
2.346 
(2.926) 
2.275 
(2.915) 
2.213 
(2.910) 
2.235 
(2.911) 
2.227 
(2.909) 
Log Sales 
-0.198*** 
(0.06) 
-0.202*** 
(0.061) 
-0.201*** 
(0.060) 
-0.203*** 
(0.060) 
-0.205*** 
(0.060) 
-0.201*** 
(0.06) 
Log Age  
-0.419*** 
(0.106) 
-0.451*** 
(0.109) 
-0.456*** 
(0.109) 
-0.456*** 
(0.109) 
-0.453*** 
(0.108) 
-0.456*** 
(0.109) 
Log Proceeds 
-0.331** 
(0.161) 
-0.337** 
(0.16) 
-0.333** 
(0.159) 
-0.331** 
(0.159) 
-0.335** 
(0.159) 
-0.335** 
(0.16) 
Rank 
0.203** 
(0.085) 
0.214*** 
(0.083) 
0.215*** 
(0.083) 
0.217*** 
(0.082) 
0.211** 
(0.084) 
0.207** 
(0.084) 
Internet 
-0.411 
(0.318) 
-0.416 
(0.318) 
-0.424 
(0.318) 
-0.424 
(0.318) 
-0.425 
(0.317) 
-0.430 
(0.317) 
Nasdaq 
0.203 
(0.184) 
0.203 
(0.184) 
0.203 
(0.184) 
0.208 
(0.184) 
0.202 
(0.184) 
0.205 
(0.184) 
Lockup 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Market Return 
-1.345** 
(0.525) 
-1.351*** 
(0.522) 
-1.362*** 
(0.521) 
-1.393*** 
(0.519) 
-1.338** 
(0.52) 
-1.336** 
(0.52) 
Underpricing 
1.337 
(0.348) 
1.347 
(0.349) 
1.352 
(0.349) 
1.356 
(0.349) 
1.352 
(0.349) 
1.345 
(0.349) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Numb. of obs. 915 915 915 915 915 915 
 
Dependent variables are valuations calculated by sale comparables and Tobin’s Q. VCTotal is the number of distinct VCs that 
provide capital before the IPO date. We drop single VC backed IPOs from the sample. RoundVCSize is the mean number of 
distinct VCs that provide capital per round. VCDivIndex is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types within the 
syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC), (ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different 
nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC firms. VCDivPCA is the principal component calculated based 
on four dimensions that we used for computing diversity index. VCSizeLarge is one if the mean VC syndicate size per round 
is greater than or equal to the median of the sample. VCDivHigh is one if the diversity index of the syndicate is larger than 8.3, 
the median of the sample. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first investment 
round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. Age is the 
difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer size in terms 
of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Internet is equal to one if the IPO firm is 
identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in Nasdaq and 
zero otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the issue date. 
Underpricing is first day return. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 8. OLS regressions for the relation of VC syndicate size and diversity on CAR 
Variable CAR[1,36] CAR[1,36] CAR[1,36] CAR[1,36] CAR[1,36] CAR[1,36] 
Intercept 
-0.239 
(0.397) 
-0.232 
(0.400) 
-0.194 
(0.403) 
-0.366 
(0.395) 
-0.290 
(0.396) 
-0.273 
(0.396) 
VCTotal 
-0.026*** 
(0.009)    
  
RoundVCSize 
 
-0.046* 
(0.026)   
  
VCDivIndex 
  
-0.021* 
(0.012)  
  
VCDivPCA 
   
-0.055** 
(0.026) 
  
VCSizeLarge 
    
-0.198** 
(0.080)  
VCDivHigh 
     
-0.191** 
(0.079) 
LeadVCRep 
-0.321 
(2.057) 
-0.294 
(2.066) 
-0.315 
(2.068) 
-0.348 
(2.062) 
-0.205 
(2.049) 
-0.211 
(2.057) 
Log Sales 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.059** 
(0.026) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
Log Age  
-0.020 
(0.066) 
-0.035 
(0.067) 
-0.035 
(0.067) 
-0.036 
(0.066) 
-0.039 
(0.067) 
-0.041 
(0.067) 
Log Proceeds 
-0.142** 
(0.056) 
-0.133** 
(0.056) 
-0.132** 
(0.055) 
-0.131** 
(0.055) 
-0.131** 
(0.055) 
-0.131** 
(0.055) 
Rank 
0.123*** 
(0.034) 
0.122*** 
(0.034) 
0.121*** 
(0.034) 
0.123*** 
(0.034) 
0.122*** 
(0.034) 
0.121*** 
(0.034) 
Internet 
-0.096 
(0.120) 
-0.102 
(0.121) 
-0.103 
(0.121) 
-0.102 
(0.121) 
-0.103 
(0.120) 
-0.102 
(0.120) 
Nasdaq 
0.025 
(0.098) 
0.025 
(0.099) 
0.026 
(0.098) 
0.026 
(0.098) 
0.024 
(0.098) 
0.028 
(0.099) 
Lockup 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Market Return 
-0.494* 
(0.271) 
-0.493* 
(0.271) 
-0.486* 
(0.271) 
-0.501* 
(0.271) 
-0.496* 
(0.271) 
-0.493* 
(0.27) 
Above 
-0.300 
(0.099) 
-0.301 
(0.099) 
-0.304 
(0.099) 
-0.304 
(0.099) 
-0.299 
(0.099) 
-0.299 
(0.099) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Numb. of obs. 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 
 
Dependent variables are cumulative abnormal return in the window [1,36] after the IPO date. VCTotal is the number of distinct 
VCs that provide capital before the IPO date. We drop single VC backed IPOs from the sample. RoundVCSize is the mean 
number of distinct VCs that provide capital per round. VCDivIndex is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types 
within the syndicate (e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC), (ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, 
(iii) different nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC firms. VCSizeLarge is one if the mean VC syndicate 
size per round is greater than or equal to the median of the sample. VCDivHigh is one if the diversity index of the syndicate is 
larger than 8.3, the median of the sample. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before 
the first investment round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before 
issuance. Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is 
the offer size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Internet is equal to 
one if the IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm 
is listed in Nasdaq and zero otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month 
before the issue date. Above takes value one if the IPO is priced above the original filing price range and zero otherwise. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively.        
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Table 9. OLS regressions for the relation between VC syndicate and post-IPO valuation based on 
EBITDA comparables  
Variable Ebitda_Comp Ebitda_Comp Ebitda_Comp Ebitda_Comp Ebitda_Comp Ebitda_Comp 
Intercept 
1.111 
(0.752) 
1.194 
(0.754) 
1.238 
(0.758) 
0.982 
(0.751) 
0.840 
(0.813) 
0.850 
(0.812) 
VCTotal 
-0.023* 
(0.013)    
  
RoundVCSize 
 
-0.062** 
(0.033)   
  
VCDivIndex 
  
-0.029** 
(0.015)  
  
VCDivPCA 
   
-0.066** 
(0.033) 
  
VCSizeLarge 
    
-0.088 
(0.115)  
VCDivHigh 
     
-0.140 
(0.113) 
LeadVCRep 
-0.614 
(2.757) 
-0.487 
(2.762) 
-0.553 
(2.757) 
-0.590 
(2.758) 
-1.581 
(3.100) 
-1.565 
(3.101) 
Log Sales 
0.092*** 
(0.035) 
0.09*** 
(0.035) 
0.092*** 
(0.035) 
0.091*** 
(0.035) 
0.086** 
(0.039) 
0.085** 
(0.039) 
Log Age  
-0.363*** 
(0.092) 
-0.390*** 
(0.093) 
-0.391*** 
(0.093) 
-0.389*** 
(0.093) 
-0.354*** 
(0.098) 
-0.361*** 
(0.099) 
Log Proceeds 
0.192* 
(0.103) 
0.188* 
(0.103) 
0.192* 
(0.103) 
0.193* 
(0.103) 
0.081 
(0.146) 
0.080 
(0.146) 
Rank 
0.060 
(0.041) 
0.066 
(0.041) 
0.065 
(0.040) 
0.066 
(0.040) 
0.088* 
(0.049) 
0.091* 
(0.048) 
Internet 
-0.287* 
(0.167) 
-0.290* 
(0.167) 
-0.292* 
(0.167) 
-0.290* 
(0.167) 
-0.378** 
(0.180) 
-0.378** 
(0.180) 
Nasdaq 
-0.112 
(0.159) 
-0.113 
(0.159) 
-0.112 
(0.159) 
-0.109 
(0.159) 
-0.107 
(0.180) 
-0.104 
(0.180) 
Lockup 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Market Return 
-0.372 
(0.391) 
-0.372 
(0.391) 
-0.365 
(0.391) 
-0.376 
(0.391) 
-0.122 
(0.419) 
-0.127 
(0.419) 
Above 
0.242 
(0.135) 
0.238 
(0.135) 
0.235 
(0.135) 
0.235 
(0.135) 
0.292 
(0.146) 
0.292 
(0.146) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Numb. of obs. 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 
  
Dependent variables are valuations calculated by Ebitda comparables. VCTotal is the number of distinct VCs that provide 
capital before the IPO date. We drop single VC backed IPOs from the sample. RoundVCSize is the mean number of distinct 
VCs that provide capital per round. VCDivIndex is an index which is total number of (i) different VC types within the syndicate 
(e.g. private, investment bank or corporate VC), (ii) different industry preferences of syndicating VCs, (iii) different 
nationalities of participating VCs and (iv) age brackets of VC firms. VCSizeLarge is one if the mean VC syndicate size per 
round is greater than or equal to the median of the sample. VCDivHigh is one if the diversity index of the syndicate is larger 
than 8.3, the median of the sample. LeadVCRep is the lead VC’s IPO market share during the three-year period before the first 
investment round. Sales stand for company size and represent net company sales (in millions) in the fiscal year before issuance. 
Age is the difference between year of IPO date and the year of date when the company is incorporated. Proceeds is the offer 
size in terms of net proceeds. Rank is from Loughran and Ritter underwriter rank classification. Internet is equal to one if the 
IPO firm is identified as internet company in the database complied by J. Ritter. Nasdaq takes value one if the firm is listed in 
Nasdaq and zero otherwise. Market Return is defined as mean value-weighted CRSP index return over the month before the 
issue date. Above takes value one if the IPO is priced above the original filing price range and zero otherwise. Significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively.     
